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Abstract 
This paper examines the characteristics of the production network of Korean carmakers 
in China. It was found that Korean automotive firms in China are forming production 
networks around Beijing where Hyundai Motors is located. The production network of 
Korean automotive firms has changed from the vertical and closed structure into a more 
horizontal and open structure with the intensifying competition. This paper suggests that 
the government needs to select and raise the Korean firms’ performance to enhance their 
competitiveness in China. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2006, the Korean automobile industry ranked fifth largest automobile producer 
in the world, following Japan and the United States after making dramatically rapid 
progress since it started with almost no foothold in the industry about fifty years ago. 
Furthermore, the Korean automobile industry holds a prominent position in the national 
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economy. As of 2005, it accounted for 8.9 percent of the total employees, 11.5 percent 
of the gross output, 10.2 percent of the value added amount and 10.3 percent of the total 
export amount in Korea’s manufacturing sector. Direct and indirect employment 
creation effects reached up 1.57 million employees, accounting for 10.38 percent of the 
total employment. Moreover, the trade surplus from the industry recorded 29.9 billion 
US dollars in 2006, making it the largest exporting industry of Korea. 
 
Table 1: A Summary of Korean Automobile Industry 
Number of 
establishments 
Number of workers Gross output 
Value of 
shipment 
Export 
amount 
Value added 
amount 
Year 
firms % thousand % 
Bil. 
KW 
% 
Bil. 
KW 
% 
Bil. 
US$
% 
Bil. 
KW 
% 
1985 882 2 81.7 3.35 3.3 4.26 3.3 4.26 5.4 1.8 1 3.87
1990 2,138 3.1 186.3 6.17 16.2 9.16 16.1 9.18 19.1 2.94 5.8 8.23
1995 3,070 3.19 220.6 7.47 35.1 9.62 34.5 9.62 82.9 6.63 13.1 8.2
2000 3,200 3.26 204 7.69 53.9 9.54 53.4 9.54 131 7.61 20.6 9.38
2005 3,848 3.28 253.5 8.85 97.8 11.48 97.9 11.54 293 10.3 32 10.24
Note: All the percentage figures present the proportions in the manufacturing sector except for the export 
amount in the whole industry. 
Source: The Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2007). 
 
In 1990s, the Korean automobile industry suffered from the restructuring process 
prompted by the bankruptcy of KIA automobile company and further catalyzed by the 
1997 financial crisis. This process has been considerably changing the component 
procurement structure which occupies a core position in the car industry production 
network or value chain. In other words, a certain change has been taking place in the 
exclusive and single layer structure of division of labor caused by the vertical 
integration policy between domestic carmakers and the component suppliers since the 
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1980s. 
At the same time, there is an indication of another change in overseas production 
network of the automobile industry. Recent years have witnessed Korean carmakers 
aggressively seeking out production bases overseas, especially in China. However, there 
are few actual analyses on the types of network structure in which these foreign invested 
carmakers are doing their component procurement, production, sales, research and 
development (R&D), and various value chain activities.  Therefore, this study attempts 
to figure out the actual conditions of the production network of Korean carmakers in 
China. 
To analyze the current situations and characteristics of the automobile components 
suppliers in China, this study utilized existing information on the current state (as of the 
end of 2006) of 126 automobile components suppliers invested in China and registered 
with the Korea Auto Industries Coop. Association (KAICA). Field research was also 
conducted by interviewing Hyundai Motors and several component suppliers in Beijing 
– taking into consideration that Korean auto companies are forming a production cluster 
in the said city. This field research provided this study with a rich resource to examine 
the production network of Korean companies in China and its characteristics. 
This paper is mainly composed of three parts as follows: The first part,deals with 
the features of the domestic production network of Korean automobile industry and its 
recent changes. It was necessary to first look into the domestic production network 
because this could be the prototype used for the overseas production networks of the 
foreign invested companies. This section also discusses the drastic changes of the 
domestic production network after the economic crisis in 1997.  
The second part includes basic information on the current situation of automobile 
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component suppliers in China based on data regarding main production bases, number 
of companies, location of industries, and features of the business relationships, among 
others.  
The last part presents the result of the field interviews with the automakers and 
component suppliers in Beijing to examine their strategies in material sourcing, sales 
and production, and R&D. 
 
1. THE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION NETWORK OF KOREAN 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
 
The Korean automobile industry has been showing a dramatic amount of growth 
since Sin Jin Motors started knock-down assembling in the 1960s. The automakers were 
first established, followed by the component suppliers, under the firm support of the 
government. Automakers were always in the lead over the component suppliers in terms 
of capital accumulation and technical capabilities so that the former nurtured the latter 
by training them on technologies and management skills. The Korean automobile 
industry greatly owed its success to efficient technical learning from foreign countries. 
Component suppliers learned the general technologies such as business 
management and quality controls; meanwhile they received special technologies on the 
relevant components directly from their foreign affiliate companies. Under this kind of 
development process, the relationship between the carmakers and the component 
suppliers became a vertical transaction relationship where the carmakers built strong 
controls over the component suppliers. The accumulation of chronic problems such as 
exclusiveness of component supply structure and small scales of component suppliers 
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was the result of the vertical systematization policy.  
The contract structure of Korean automobile industry before the financial crisis is 
basically characterized by the carmakers’ component sourcing from their affiliates or 
subsidiaries, the exclusive structure of the vertical systematization, and single layer 
structure of division of labor. 
First, before the financial crisis, core automotive components were procured by the 
chaebolii affiliates and subsidiaries. Affiliates mean the companies that belong to the 
same company group and are directly related to each other in the group in terms of the 
capital ownership. Subsidiaries, on the other hand, are the component suppliers that 
belong to and are run by the relatives of the founders or controlling stockholders of the 
chaebols but have no ownership relations. Examples of the subsidiaries of the Hyundai 
group are Mando Machinery Cooperation, Halla Climate Control Corporation, and 
SungWoo Group. These affiliates and subsidiaries extensively dealt with related auto 
parts such as air conditioners, audio components, batteries, and the like as well as the 
capital intensive components such as gear, steering, braking and electrical parts. As of 
1995, the supply from the affiliates and subsidiaries accounted for 41 percent- 46 
percent of the total component supply (Cho, S.J. et. al. 2004). iii  The carmakers 
maintained a very closed component sourcing structure where they procured the core 
and related parts only through their affiliates and subsidiaries.  
Second, the exclusive transactions were formed between the assembling companies 
and the component suppliers through the vertical systematization during the stage of 
passenger car development for export in 1980s. In 1995, 657 out of 1,150 component 
suppliers transacted with only one carmaker which means 57.1 percent of the total 
component suppliers were involved in exclusive transactions. Another 21.3 percent of 
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the component suppliers transacted with only two carmakers. The carmakers’ strong 
control over the component suppliers resulted in this exclusive transaction structure. 
This system resulted in low benefit of scale and the component suppliers remained in 
small scale because each carmaker had its own set of exclusive component suppliers. 
 
Table 2: The Number of Parent Companies of Component Suppliers Before the 
Financial Crisis 
Unit: number of companies (%) 
  1 company 2 companies 3 companies 4 companies 5 companies
6 companies 
or more 
Total 
1990 682 (66.9) 188 (18.4) 87 (8.5) 39 (3.8) 24 (2.4) - 1,020 (100.0) 
1995 657 (57.1) 245 (21.3) 109 (9.5) 59 (5.1) 40 (3.5) 40 (3.5) 1,150 (100.0) 
1996 649 (58.2) 238 (21.3) 93 (8.3) 58 (5.2) 39 (3.5) 39 (3.5) 1,116 (100.0) 
1997 619 (57.4) 236 (21.9) 87 (8.1) 59 (5.5) 37 (3.4) 41 (3.8) 1,079 (100.0) 
1998 510 (55.0) 212 (22.8) 74 (8.0) 59 (6.4) 32 (3.4) 41 (4.4) 928 (100.0) 
1999 570 (65.9) 158 (18.3) 80 (9.2) 57 (6.6) - - 865 (100.0) 
Source: The Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2007). 
 
Third, the division of labor had a tendency to a single layer structure before the 
1997 financial crisis. In the past, the division of labor of Korean automobile industry 
appeared to form a two-tier structure where the primary and the secondary component 
suppliers were classified and incorporated around the carmakers. However in reality, the 
primary component suppliers that directly transacted with the carmakers were large in 
number. Before the financial crisis, Hyundai had 384 primary component suppliers, Kia 
had 265, Daewoo (Heavy Industries) had 415; these figures were much more than what 
the Japanese carmakers had: Toyota, 234 and Nissan, 191. Moreover, as of 1997 only 
4.7 percent or 60 out of 1,276 primary component suppliers were large firms; 
meanwhile the most of them were small to medium enterprises, and 589 companies 
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(46.2%) even had less than 50 employees. The reason that the primary component 
suppliers were mostly small to medium firms was that the carmakers placed their orders 
by units and not by systems. Furthermore, the domestic component industry was weak 
in technological capabilities so that they could not produce system components.iv 
Thus, the contract structure of Korean automobile industry before the financial 
crisis was built on the vertical systematization and characterized by the exclusive 
transaction of single layered and closed structure. And yet considerable changes 
happened to the Korean automotive component industry and its supply structure. The 
depression of the automotive industry caused by the bankruptcy of Kia Motors in 1997 
followed the restructuring of the carmakers, active investment of foreign capitals into 
the domestic component suppliers, reorganization of subsidiaries, modularization, and 
diversification of the business channel by the component suppliers. 
First of all, the restructuring of the eight carmakers before the financial crisis ended 
up with only five, namely, Hyundai, Kia, GM Daewoo, Renault Samsung and 
Ssangyong. This big merger and acquisition among the carmakers changed the 
exclusive transaction structure which had been pointed out as a chronic problem of the 
Korean automobile industry. Also after the financial crisis, another factor contributed to 
the change of competition structure of the domestic automotive component industry; 
many foreign special component suppliers entered the Korean market which began to 
actively invest into the domestic component suppliers. The number of foreign invested 
firms (primary component firms) continued to grow; it was 148 in 2003, 176 in 2006.v 
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Table 3: Number of Foreign Invested Firms 
Year 
Foreign invested firms 
(Primary component suppliers)
Domestic Firms Total 
2003 148 730 878 
2004 163 750 913 
2005 173 749 922 
2006 176 726 902 
Note: The classification of the foreign invested firms over the primary component 
suppliers began in 2003. Before 2003, the classification of primary or 
secondary suppliers was not applied to the foreign invested firms.  
Source: The Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2007). 
 
In addition, the previous component supply system run by the affiliates and 
subsidiaries was changed into the affiliates system and the modularization system at the 
same time. In case of Hyundai Motors that had many subsidiary transactions in the past, 
the subsidiary system has drastically been weakened after the bankruptcy of the Halla 
group that had control over the core component suppliers such as Mando Machinery 
Cooperation and Halla Climate Control Corp. Hyundai Mobis became the biggest 
component supply subsidiary of Hyundai Motors in place of Mando Machinery 
Cooperation. As a result, the component supply structure centered by the subsidiary 
based on the ownership has been formed such as Hyundai Kia Automotive Group with 
Hyundai Mobis, and GM Daewoo with Delphi (GM’s 100% subsidiary). On the basis of 
this new subsidiary-centered component supply system, the production system began to 
be modularized. 
Hyundai and Kia Motors began to promote the modularization of production 
system in 1999. This means delivering the assembled goods in modules which enables 
the common use, large scale production and outsourcing of the components. 
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Modularization propels the two-tier structure of component supply because the 
component firms disqualified as primary component suppliers can become the 
secondary component suppliers contracted by the bigger component suppliers. This new 
structure of component supply will become more distinctive if the modularization of 
domestic production system makes progress in the future. 
Lastly, the diversification of the transaction channel of the component suppliers 
shows the eased tendency of exclusive transaction structure after the financial crisis. In 
1990, the component suppliers of the four carmakers that had only one transaction 
partner reached 66.9 percent, but this proportion declined to 55.4 percent in 2001. By 
2005, among the component suppliers of the seven carmakers (Hyundai, Kia, GM 
Daewoo, Ssangyong, Renault Samsung, Daewoo Bus, Tata Daewoo) half or 50 percent 
contracted with only one carmaker. 
Four main factors led to the reduction of exclusive transaction in the automobile 
industry and diversification of the transaction channels: 1) Kia’s merger with Hyundai 
promoted the opening of the transaction channel between the two carmakers’ 
component suppliers so that the suppliers for Hyundai can take orders from Kia and 
vice versa; 2) GM and Renault which acquired Daewoo and Samsung fostered the 
transactions of their own component suppliers with the other domestic carmakers in 
order to introduce incentives for the self-development of the suppliers; 3) As the foreign 
special component suppliers advanced into the Korean market, the component suppliers 
themselves carved out new delivery channels; and, 4) The automotive component 
imports from developed countries like Japan and Germany, and including China have 
increased. In 2005, the import of automotive components recorded 3 billion US dollars, 
a 12.2 percent increase over the previous year. Most of the imports were mainly 
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composed of universal parts with low price and high-tech components of which the 
domestic suppliers lack the technological capabilities to develop. 
Although the diversification of the transaction channel means the heightened 
competition in the component market, the phenomenon itself does not translate to 
strengthened autonomy or increased negotiation power of the component suppliers. 
Above all, the crossing component supply by the component suppliers of Hyundai and 
Kia that is attributed to the recent diversification of the transaction channel cannot be 
considered as real diversification because Hyundai and Kia are interrelated through 
ownership.vi 
 
Table 4: The Number of Parent Companies of Component Suppliers After the 
Financial Crisis 
Unit: number of companies (%) 
Year 
1  
company 
2  
companies 
3  
companies 
4  
companies 
5  
companies 
6  
companies or 
more 
Total 
1999 570 (65.9) 158 (18.3) 80 (9.2) 57 (6.6) - -  865 (100.0)
2000 528 (58.3) 209 (23.1) 95 (10.5) 74 (8.1) - - 906 (100.0)
2001 488 (55.4) 215 (24.4) 102 (11.6) 76 (8.6) - - 881 (100.0)
2002 427 (50.4) 210 (24.8) 102 (12.0) 62 (7.3) 30 (3.5) 17 (2.0) 848 (100.0)
2003 450 (51.3) 217 (24.7) 94 (10.7) 61 (6.9) 34 (3.9) 22 (2.5) 878 (100.0)
2004 459 (50.3) 222 (24.3) 111 (12.2) 63 (6.9) 36 (3.9) 22 (2.4) 913 (100.0)
2005 461 (50.0) 228 (24.7) 109 (11.8) 62 (6.7) 41 (4.4) 21 (2.3) 922 (100.0)
2006 460 (51.0) 218 (24.2) 98 (10.9) 68 (7.5) 39 (4.3) 19 (2.1) 902 (100.0)
Note: The numbers until 2000 represent only 4 carmakers: Hyundai, Kia, Daewoo and Ssangyong. 
Source: The Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2007). 
 
As the Daewoo group collapsed and the Hyundai group was divided after the 
financial crisis, the chaebol characteristics of the carmakers were weakened so that the 
long lasting business system of carmakers’ transaction with affiliate companies 
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gradually disintegrated. Thus the old affiliate transaction system was changed into 
subsidiary/invested company’s supply system to improve the transparency of contract 
deals. Consequently, the exclusive and single layered structure of division of labor in 
the past was eased. Also, the single layered division of labor was rapidly changed into a 
two-tier structure. However, with the stronger control of Hyundai motor group over the 
component market and the promoted modularization centered on the subsidiary 
companies, it does not seem that the vertical relationship between the carmakers and the 
component suppliers is developing into equal relations or the autonomy and negotiation 
power of the component suppliers are enhanced. 
 
Table 5: Changes of the Component Supply Structure Before and After the 
Financial Crisis 
Before the crisis  After the crisis 
 Component supply by the 
carmakers’ subsidiary/affiliate 
companies 
 Decline in transactions of affiliate firms due to the automobile 
industry restructuring and the establishment of component 
production systems centered around the subsidiary, invested 
companies based on ownership 
 Exclusive structure by the vertical 
systematizaiton 
 Reduced exclusive dealings and increased diversification of 
the transaction channel of the component suppliers 
 Single layered structure of division 
of labor 
 Two-tier structure of component supply system by the 
modularization of production system after 1999 
 
2. KOREAN AUTOMOTIVE COMPANIES’ PRODUCTION 
NETWORK IN CHINA 
 
2.1. Korean Automotive Companies’ Advance into China and their Production  
We will first look at the Korean carmakers’ entry into the Chinese market. Hyundai 
342 
Motors which ranked seventh in the world automotive market in terms of car sales 
entered the Chinese market by establishing a joint venture, Wuhanwantong (武漢萬通) 
Automotive Limited Company with Dongnanqiche (東南汽車). In 2002, however, 
Hyundai withdrew from the Woohanwantong partnership, transferred all the shares to 
Dongfengjituan (東風集團) and established a new joint venture Dongfeng Yueda Kia 
(東風悅達起亞). 
Meanwhile, Kia Motors set up a joint venture, Yueda Kia Motor Limited 
Company (悅達起亞自動車有限會社) with the Yueda group in 1997 where each 
company owned a 50 percent stake. After Hyundai Motors’ acquisition of Kia Motors, it 
acquired 20 percent share of Yueda Kia in September 2000. In March 2002, Hyundai, 
Kia, Dongfeng and the Yueda group agreed to set up a new joint venture named 
Dongfeng Yueda Kia Motors; Kia Motors owned a 50 percent stake, with Yueda and 
Dongfeng owning 25 percent each. By the end of 2002, Dongfeng Yueda Kia launched 
Qianlima (千里馬) modeled after Hyundai Motor’s ACCENT. 
On the other hand, in May 2002, Hyundai Motors established another joint 
venture, Beijing Hyundai Automotive Limited Company (北京現代汽車有限公司) 
with Beijingqiche (北京汽車) on a fifty-fifty share to try independently entering the 
Chinese automotive market. The new joint venture started production of SONATA in 
December 2002.vii,viii Also for its global strategy 2010, Hyundai Motors plans to 
develop regional strategic car models by building a full line-up in China, managing self-
sufficient plants including research institutes and sharing the platforms. 
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Table 6: Automotive Companies of Hyundai Motors Group in China (as of 2005) 
 Shares 
Starting 
Year 
Main Models 
Production capability in 
2005 
北京現代
汽車 
(BHMC) 
Hyundai 50% 
北京汽車 50% 
2002 
SONATA 
AVANTE 
TUCSON 
300 thousand 
(600 thousand in 2008) 
合肥江淮
汽車 
Technology offer 2003 STAREX 
90 thousand 
(plan to cooperate in 
commercial vehicle) 
榮成華泰
汽車 
Technology offer 2000 
GALLOPER 
TERRACAN 
70 thousand 
(100 thousand in 2007) 
Hyundai 
広州現代
汽車 
n.a. 
2007 
(plan) 
Truck, Bus (20 thousand, plan) 
Kia 
東風悅達
起亞 
Kia 50%  
東風 25% 
悅達 25% 
2002 
千里馬,  
OPTIMA 
CARNIVAL 
130 thousand 
(plan to establish second 
plant in 2007, 430 
thousand) 
Note: Rongchenghuatai Motors(榮成華泰汽車) is located in Shandong province and Jianghui Motors (江
淮汽車) in Anhui province. 
Source: The Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (2007) p. 13; FOURIN (2006), p. 302. 
 
Beijing Hyundai (北京現代) grew rapidly so that the annual sales recorded 290,000 
in 2006 (sales ranking 5th, market share 7.2%). In 2005, sales reached 233,000 – ranking 
4th and recording 7.4 percent market share. In terms of sedan passenger car, the 
company’s sales ranked first in the Chinese market. It also took 73 percent market share 
in the Beijing taxi car business recording 22,500 in sales in 2005. Thus the Korean 
automotive companies’ (Hyundai and Kia) market share in China rose to 12 percent. In 
contrast to the fast shrinking market share of EU in the Chinese automotive market, 
Korea and Japan are making a remarkable progress in recent years as shown in Figure 1. 
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Table 7: Production and Sales of Beijing Hyundai (北京現代) 
Unit: number of cars 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SONATA 1,046 54,348 41,451 47,175 49,379 
Elantra - 765 108,707 173,756 168,268 
Tucson - - - 9,754 27,973 
ACCENT - - - 3 44,468 
Production 
TOTAL 1,046 55,113 150,158 230,688 290,088 
SONATA 1,002 51,950 41,342 48,072 49,945 
Elantra - 178 102,748 176,589 169,716 
Tucson - - - 9,007 28,176 
ACCENT - - - - 42,174 
Sales 
TOTAL 1,002 52,128 144,090 233,668 290,011 
Source: Interview with Beijing Hyundai.  
 
Figure 1: Market Shares of Various Countries in Chinese Automotive Market 
 
Note: By October for 2006. 
Source: A.T. Kearney (2007). 
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The remarkable development of the Korean carmakers in China like Beijing 
Hyundai ( 北京現代 ) may be attributed to the following factors: 1) expedient 
construction of the plants. For example, Beijing Hyundai could finish the construction 
of the plants and start production within three months after the ratification of its joint 
venture in September 2002; 2) capacity to immediately establish more plants and 
produce more cars to cope with the abrupt increase in demand. Five more models were 
produced in only four years from the first production of SONATA in December 2002 to 
the end of 2006. Over the years, production continuously increased so that in February 
2003 it produced 50,000 cars; in March 2004, 150,000;, and in July 2005, 300,000; 3) 
value was placed on automation and operation efficiency  The car body process 
automation reached 100 percent and hours per vehicle (HPV) representing the 
productivity of the assembly lines ranked first in all the Hyundai automotive plants 
overseas.ix; 4) advance into the market jointly with the component suppliers. Therefore, 
the companies could build up competitive production base within a short time. This 
strategy was similar to the typical market entry strategies of Japanese carmakers into the 
North American automobile market. 
In 2007, however, Beijing Hyundai was facing difficulties in car sales. Its sales goal 
in 2007 was originally 310,000 cars but had to be readjusted to 260,000, a reduction by 
50,000 because the total car sales until August had reached only 146,000 (car sales 
ranking 8th). Several internal and external factors caused Beijing Hyundai to fall into 
this difficult situation. Internal factors were: inferiority in brand value, low 
accountability due to inconsistent price policy (delayed purchase with the expectation of 
lower price in the future), price positioning strategy lacking differentiated points (price 
differentiation problem among the cars in the same category produced by Beijing 
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Hyundai and DongfengYueda Kia), among others.  
External factors were: the intensified competition among the carmakers in the 
Chinese market such as the preemptive price cut-down by GM and VW (Volkswagen),x 
strengthening sales service by Toyota, aggressive strategies by introducing various 
models into the Chinese market, and catch-up of Chinese carmakers.  
In order to cope with the hardship, Beijing Hyundai’s strategies included price 
cutting for the short term; training of car dealers and expanding localized marketing, 
introducing new models by establishing second plants and enhancing the localization 
for the mid-term. For its long-term strategy, the company will pursue a dual price 
system divided into luxury and ordinary cars by enhancing the brand power and 
improving consumer satisfaction.xi 
 
Table 8: Lowering Prices of Several Carmakers in China  
Carmaker Model Date 
Lowering 
amount 
(Yuan) 
Lowering 
percentage 
Market price 
after lowering
(Yuan) 
Beijing Hyundai 
Market price(Yuan) / 
car model in rivalry 
Rover 07. 1. 3 6,900 8.4% 74,900 79,800 / ACCENT 
上海 GM 
Acceler 07. 3. 2 10,000 8.5% 99,000 
Jetta 6,000 6.3% 69,000 
一汽 VW 
Bora 
07. 3. 6 
8,000 6.2% 123,800
Santana 10,000 11.1% 79,800 
99,800 / Elantra 
上海 VW 
San 3000 
07. 3. 15 
11,000 10.1% 97,800 120,000 / EF 
TIENA 23,000 9.8% 205,800 107,800 / NF 
東風 Nissan 
Tida 
07. 3. 26 
10,000 8.3% 104,800 99,800 / Elantra 
Source: Beijing field research interview 
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2.2 The Networking Structure in China 
By the end of 2006, there were 126 component suppliers registered in the Korea 
Automobile Manufacturers Association that entered the Chinese market. Using the 
establishment of Beijing Hyundai in 2002 as the reference point, 33 companies went to 
China before then and 90 companies afterwards; the entry dates of the remaining 3 
companies are unknown. Now we look at the networking structure among the carmakers 
and component suppliers in China mostly by examining the data of the above mentioned 
companies.xii 
The number of component suppliers entering the Chinese market sharply increased 
in the watershed year of 2002 (refer to Figure 2). This is the same period Hyundai 
Motors started its operations in China. Therefore it can be interpreted that the 
component suppliers accompanied Hyundai Motors’ entry into the country. Eighty (80) 
or 65 percent of the total component suppliers entered the Chinese market from 2002 to 
2004. 
By region, Korean component suppliers are concentrated in Beijing and the 
provinces of Shandong and Jiangsu (refer to Table 9). Hyundai and Kia motors entered 
into Beijing and Jiangsu, so it can be considered that the component suppliers went with 
them to these regions. The component suppliers in Shandong province are delivering to 
Hyundai and Kia Motors as well as exporting back to Korea. Fifteen (15) suppliers went 
to Shandong, 25 to Beijing, and 23 to Jiangsu from 2002 to 2004. 
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Figure 2: Automotive Component Suppliers’ Entering Chinese Market by Period 
 
 
Note: Three companies whose date of entering is unknown were excluded. 
Source: Korea Auto Industries Coop. Association (KAICA). 
 
Table 9: Regional Distribution of the Korean Auto Component Suppliers in 
Chinese Market (As of the End of 2006) 
Unit: company (%) 
 
Shan 
dong 
Beijing Jinagsu Tianjin
Shang
hai
Liao
ning
Guang
dong
Zhe 
jiang 
Hebei 
Number of companies 
33 
(26.2) 
30 
(23.8)
27 
(21.4)
8 
(6.3)
5 
(4.0)
5 
(4.0)
4 
(3.2)
3 
(2.4) 
3 
(2.4) 
 
Gui 
zhou 
Jilin Hebei
Heilong
jiang
Guang
xi 
Hong 
Kong
Total 
Number of companies 
2 
(1.6) 
2 
(1.6)
1 
(0.8)
1 
(0.8)
1 
(0.8)
1 
(0.8)
126 
(100.0) 
Note: percentages in the parentheses. 
Source: Korea Auto Industries Coop. Association (KAICA) 
 
By employment scale, medium enterprises with 50-299 employees predominated, 
accounting for 54.7 percent of the total component suppliers; medium firms with 100-
299 employees make up 35.7 percent; and large firms with more than 300 employees 
accounted for 21.4 percent. Compared to the number of domestic auto component 
Number of component suppliers
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suppliers by the employment scale in the previous part of this paper,xiii small companies 
take a large proportion in the domestic suppliers (domestic firms 28.7% > firms entering 
China 19.0%); meanwhile, there are more medium and large firms entering into China 
compared to their domestic counterparts (firms entering China medium firms 54.7% + 
large firms 21.4% > domestic medium firms 53.2% + large firms 18.1%). The reason 
that the big scale component suppliers entering China is relatively large in numbers is 
that they are actively taking advantage of cheap and sufficient human capital within 
country and also it seems that the component suppliers expanded their scale as Beijing 
Hyundai rapidly grew. 
 
Table 10: Number of Firms by Employment Scale 
Unit: number of companies (%) 
Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
 
  Less than 50 
employees 
50-99 100-299 
More than 300 
persons 
n.a. Total 
Number of 
companies 
24 
(19.0) 
24 
(19.0) 
45 
(35.7) 
27 
(21.4) 
6 
(4.8) 
126 
(100.0) 
Note: Classification of scale using the criteria of KAICA. 
Source: KAICA 
 
Considering the component firms going to China by the structure of shares, there 
are 76 companies with 100 percent shares (60.3%), and 21 firms which own 51-99 
percent shares (16.7%). Taken together, we can see that the companies holding the right 
of management control reached 77.0 percent. Before 2002, 16 out of 33 invested firms 
had 100 percent shares (48.5%); after 2002, 60 out of 89 companies (67.4%) owned 100 
percent (excluding 4 companies whose percentage of shares is unknown). It seems that 
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guaranteed sales channel by accompanying with the carmakers increased the cases of 
full investment. 
 
Table 11: Distribution of the Firms Entering China by the Percentage of Shares 
Unit: number of companies (%) 
  1-49% 50% 51-99% 100% n.a. Total 
Number of 
companies 
18 
(14.3) 
7 
(5.6) 
21 
(16.7) 
76 
(60.3) 
4 
(3.2) 
126 
(100.0) 
Source: KAICA 
 
According to the data on the number of transaction channels of 126 component 
suppliers, 58 companies (46.0%) have two channels and 53 (42.1%) have only one 
channel. Meanwhile a much smaller number, 7 companies, are doing business with 3 
channels, and another 3 are dealing with 4 channels. Taking out the 5 companies whose 
business channels and entry dates are not known, the 121 component suppliers have 1.7 
transaction channels on the average. 
 
Table 12: Number of Transaction Channel of Korean Component Suppliers 
Entering into China 
Unit: number of companies (%) 
  1 company 2 companies 3 companies 4 companies n.a. Total 
Total 
53 
(42.1) 
58 
(46.0) 
7 
(5.5) 
3 
(2.4) 
5 
(4.0) 
126 
(100.0) 
Note: n.a. represents the case where the entry date and the number of transaction channels are not 
presented in the data source. 
Source: KAICA. 
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However, it is necessary that we break down the transaction channels of these 
suppliers shown in Table 12 because the channels include other primary component 
suppliers and export overseas in addition to the carmakers. As shown in Table 13, in the 
transaction channels of 121 component suppliers in China, carmakers make up 71.3 
percent, other primary component suppliers 14.8 percent, domestic export (buy-back) 
8.4 percent, and foreign export 2.0 percent. The delivery percentage to Hyundai and Kia 
recorded 58.4 percent and the proportions of Chinese local firms, foreign carmakers in 
China and primary component suppliers made up 5.0 percent, 7.9 percent, and 14.35 
percent respectively. 
There were 33 auto component suppliers before 2002 having an average 
transaction channel of 1.8. After 2002, as many as 88 new auto component suppliers 
entered the Chinese market with an average transaction channel of 1.6.  Hyundai and 
Kia requested the latter group suppliers to go out with them from the early stage of 
Chinese business. Hyundai and Kia may have given a guarantee to them that they will 
buy much of the components produced in local area. This guarantee is thought to be one 
of the reasons for a lower transaction channel. In contrast to the latter group, the former 
group had longer time to pioneer much more local customers. 
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Table 13: Korean Component Suppliers Entering into China by Transaction 
Channels 
Unit: number of companies (%) 
 Entered 
before 2002 
Entered 
after 2002 
 
Total 
Percent 
of Total 
Carmakers  
     Hyundai 15 51 66 32.7 
     Kia 10 42 52 52 
     Chinese local firms 7 3 10 5.0 
     Foreign firms within China 3 13 16 7.9 
Primary component suppliers  
     Korean firms 1 15 16 7.9 
     Chinese local firms 1 0 1 0.5 
     Foreign firms within China 6 7 13 6.4 
Buy-back 8 9 17 8.4 
Export 3 1 4 2.0 
Others 6 1 7 3.5 
Total 60 142 202 100 
Note: 1) Including the multiple transactions of each company. 
      2) Others represent the cases of difficult classification. 
      3) Excluding 5 companies whose business channels and entry dates are not known. 
Source: KAICA. 
 
As of 2006, on the other hand, there were 89 firms doing business with Beijing 
Hyundai including 65 Korean component suppliers entering into China. In the early 
stage, 10 suppliers accompanied Beijing Hyundai and those that had entered the market 
before 2002 also became the company’s local component suppliers. There were 35 
companies located within Beijing, and 54 outside Beijing. If the companies in the 
vicinity of Beijing like Tianjin and Hebei provinces are taken into consideration, 49 
companies (55 percent of the total firms are located within 40 km radius) are located 
near the Beijing production facility. Considering Beijing alone, 15 firms were in Shunyi 
(顺义) district where Beijing Hyundai is located.  
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In 2006, Beijing Hyundai’s 89 component suppliers are hiring 40 thousand 
employees with a total purchase amount from these suppliers reaching 18.5 billion yuan. 
The localization percentage representing the component sourcing within China reached 
80 percent due to the high modularization of component supply. Fifty percent (50%) of 
the total supply of 65 Korean component suppliers in China are components imported 
from Korea. The components produced by the suppliers in China are concentrated on 
functional parts with low price at the moment. Therefore Beijing Hyundai confronting 
the challenge of cut-throat price competition in the Chinese auto market is urged to 
promote component sourcing from local Chinese component suppliers.xiv 
 
Table 14: Beijing Hyundai’s Component Suppliers in 2003~2006 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of partner companies 44 62 69 89 
Number of employees 12 thousand 25 thousand 32 thousand 40 thousand 
Purchase amount 27.2 96.6 136 185 
EF SONATA 72% 77% 79% 81% 
ELANTRA - 77% 79% 86% 
NF SONATA - - 67% 77% 
TUCSON - - 61% 70% 
Localization 
ACCENT - - - 82% 
Note: Number of partner companies includes Chinese local firms. 
Source: Source book of Beijing Hyundai Motors Limited Company. 
 
3. CASE STUDY: BEIJING PRODUCTION NETWORK 
 
3.1. Overview 
In September 2007, we carried out a field research on the Korean automotive firms 
invested into China by interviewing one carmaker, Beijing Hyundai(BHMC), and seven 
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auto parts suppliers to find out the companies’ overview,  their strategies for sourcing 
and sales, R&D, and production.. Primary component suppliers were located in Shunyi 
and Pinggu districts within Beijing and as shown in Table 15, component suppliers that 
accompanied Beijing Hyundai are A, C, D, and F companies. The characteristics of 
sourcing, sales, R&D, and production will be argued on the basis of the interview 
results from the seven component suppliers.xv 
 
Table 15: General Information on the Interviewed Companies 
(As of September 2007) 
Company Location 
Year of 
establishment 
Shares 
(%) 
Employees
(persons)
Main parts Sales channels 
A Pinggu 2002.10 100 375 Wheel Bearing, Ball 
Joint etc. 
Hyundai (Hyundai Mobis), 
Kia, buy-back (5%) 
B Pinggu 2003.07 80 280 Intake Manifold, 
Cylinder Head 
Hyundai, Kia 
C Pinggu 2002.11 100 350 Front & Rear Cross 
Member 
Hyundai, Hyundai Mobis 
D Chaoyang 2002.09 100 20 Representative office (6 
wholly owned 
corporations, 1 joint 
venture; total employees 
1,200 persons) 
Hyundai, Kia, GM, VW, etc.
E Shunyi 2004.07 40 181 Seat Hyundai 
F Shunyi 2002 100 929 Chassis & Driving Seat 
Module, I/P 
Hyundai 
G Pinggu 2005.10 100 100 Power Steering Oil 
Pump 
Hyundai (Hyundai Mobis), 
GM, Kia, Korean primary 
component suppliers  
BHMC Shunyi 2002.10 50 4,664 5 models including EF, NF etc. 
Note: Eight auto parts suppliers were interviewed but no meaningful interview result was obtained from 
one omitted firm 
Source: Interview. 
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3.2 Sourcing Strategies 
The sourcing structures of the seven interviewed component suppliers had the 
following characteristics: 
 The local sourcing percentages recorded a relatively high 60-90 percent. The rest of 
the 10-40 percent components are mostly high tech components imported from 
Korea. Local sourcing here means both the sourcing from Korean firms invested 
into China and the local Chinese firms. From the interviews, we found that the 
proportion of the former type of local sourcing is higher that the latter (see Figure 
3).xvi  
 As the price competition gets tougher, it is recommended to raise the local sourcing 
proportion, especially changing sourcing channels to local Chinese firms. In terms 
of the present product quality, Chinese local firms have little reliability, but in the 
future the sourcing channel conversion will be realized if the competitive Chinese 
firms are selected and raised.  
 The sourcing structure between the carmakers and the component suppliers will be 
changed from vertical structure to an open one. With the intensified competition in 
the Chinese auto market, both the carmakers and the auto parts suppliers seem to 
recognize the probable change of the system well enough. 
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Figure 3: Sourcing Structure of the Automotive Component Suppliers in China 
 
Source: Yang P.S. et al. (2007). 
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Table 16: Characteristics of the Sourcing Structure of Interviewed Component 
Supply Firms 
Sourcing Strategies 
A 
 Sourcing 40 percent from Korea and 60 percent within China. Mostly sourcing from Korean 
component suppliers in China (Hisco, Northeast Steel, Chinese top 3 or 4 steel companies) 
 Actively implementing localization under the guidance of the carmakers. 100 percent localization 
goal is not easy to achieve. 
 To nurture the local firms by training the employees  
B 
 From 2004 promoted localization of Korean components (90%), and imported the rest of 10 
percent from Korea which could not be localized due to technological problems 
 Doing business with 3 Chinese local firms and searching for additional local firms (no Japanese 
firms as business partners) 
 Achieved 20 percent cost reduction by localization 
C 
 40 percent imports from Korea, 60 percent local sourcing (1 Chinese firm, and the rest (7) are 
Korean firms such as Hisco, Pyeonghwa Industry, etc.); no sourcing business with Japanese firms 
(tried in vain in 2005) 
 Having difficulties in sourcing from Korean firms due to high cost 
 Having difficulties in changing into local Chinese firms to reduce costs because the facilities and 
designs should be changed. Due to pressure to reduce costs, Korean component suppliers trying 
localization but will be realized only in 2008 when the new models will be launched. 
D 
 Chinese local sourcing 80 percent, imports from Korea 20 percent (ultra precise products etc.) 
Among 80 percent of local Chinese sourcing, 70 percent from Korean secondary vendors (raw 
materials), 30 percent from Chinese local firms (steel plates). Steel plates are to be sourced from 
local firms. 
 7 corporations sourcing from 71 suppliers (35 Korean firms, 20 Chinese firms, 16 American and 
Germany foreign invested companies; no Japanese firm due to the high price and closed business 
style) 
 Local Chinese firms offering 10-20 percent lower price, but not reliable in terms of quality and 
delivery. Foreign firms offering high price. Trying  a group negotiation with the multiple raw 
material partner companies in order to cut down cost.  
 Training the quality controls by dispatching engineers to the partner companies. 
 No business done with Japanese firms though investigating the possibility of changing the 
sourcing channel into Japanese firms 
E 
 Local sourcing 90 percent , knock down imports 10 percent. Products not necessarily reliable are 
first localized. 
 Sourcing from 9 Korean firms such as KOLON, 4 local firms such as Qingdao Huata, and 3 
foreign firms including Delphi (total 16companies) 
 Localizing sourcing for cost reduction 
 Big gap exists between Chinese central government laws and local regulations 
F 
 Component suppliers such as Sejong, Dimos, Halla Climate Control Industy, KCC, Hanil Ehwa, 
Samlip etc. entered Beijing with the carmakers. Only 2 companies out of 32 sourcing firms are 
genuinely local Chinese firms (Shandong Shuixing, Jinzhou Hanluo). 90 percent of localization. 
 The competitiveness of the cars lies in the material (sash) and due to the time problem, mostly 
relied on Korean firms. The competitiveness of local Chinese firms is weak in sash, but after 
developing a new model, planning to select and raise the local firms. 
 Pursuing the change of sourcing strategy from vertical structure to an open one in the future 
G 
 Korean invested firms in China 60 percent (located in Tianjin), importing the rest of the 40 percent 
(60% localization at the moment will be increased to 80%) 
 Price and quality are the difficulties in sourcing. Chinese materials at the moment are not reliable 
in quality. 
 No sourcing from Japanese firms 
Source: Interviews 
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3.3 Sales Strategies 
The sales structure of the seven interviewed component suppliers, on the other hand, 
was characterized as follows 
 The proportion of sales to Hyundai and Kia is very high. In case of D company that 
is equipped with its own R&D institute and G company whose headquarter develops 
the sales channels, however, they are selling products to foreign firms in China and 
Chinese local firms in addition to Hyundai and Kia. On the other hand, the above 
mentioned survey result of 22 Korean auto parts suppliers in China showed that the 
sales in the Chinese domestic market accounted for 73 percent, with sales to the 
Korean carmakers and the component suppliers making up 76 percent, 2 percent 
respectively. To sum up, the sales is composed of buy-back 22 percent, Korean 
carmakers and component suppliers in China 56.9 percent, foreign firms in China 
8.8 percent, Chinese local firms 7.3 percent and export overseas 5 percent (see 
Figure 4).  
 Each component supplier is trying to develop new sales channels as Beijing 
Hyundai that grew rapidly until 2006 slowed down in business performance in 2007. 
However, it does not seem easy to find new sales channels because of the 
conservative features of the carmakers, lack of information, and the unreasonable 
demand of Chinese firms to compromise the price. Another big difficulty on the 
sales is the cost reduction. 
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Figure 4: Sales Channels of Auto Parts Suppliers in China 
 
  Source: Yang P.S. et al. (2007). 
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Table 17: Characteristics of the Sales Structure of the Interviewed Component 
Suppliers in China 
Sales Strategies 
A 
 95 percent sales to Hyundai and Kia. 1.5 percent for buy-back to Korea, and 3.5 percent for global 
export. 
 Trying to sell to Daimler Chrysler(BBDC), 奇瑞 Automobile, GM, Suzuki etc. 
 Difficulties in developing sales channels due to the following: 
 ․ Carmakers maintaining their existing partners suppliers 
 ․ Lack of information 
 ․ Price compromising and cultural differences in doing business with Chinese local firms 
 Pessimistic outlook for sales to Japanese firms. Japanese firms doing business only among 
themselves. 
B 
 Mostly sales to Hyundai and Kia, starting sales to local Chinese firm (Anhui province Hefei 
Automobile). Developing sales channels.  
 Bad conditions of Chinese local firms’ payment (3-6 months for bill clearing) 
 No business with Japanese firms 
C 
 99 percent sales to Beijing Hyundai and Hyundai Mobis; the rest small amount to buy-back. 
 Developing new customers (not easy due to the conservative automobile industry). Chinese local 
firms demanding unreasonably low price. 
 Having intention to sell to Japanese firms but not likely to happen. 
D 
 Hyundai 40 percent, Kia 25 percent, Shanghai GM 20 percent, Shanghai VW, Ha’erbin Hefei 
Automobile, Zhang’an, Qirui etc. (Expanding sales to Shanghai GM). 100 percent Chinese 
domestic sales. 
 The biggest problem in sales is cost reduction. Sourcing localization and design change  needed. 
The risk factor is the competitive relations with Korean primary vendors. 
 Planning to expand exports to Korea, the US (GM Global project), EU etc. (30% expected in 2010)
 No sales to Japanese firms, and not likely to happen in the future 
E 
 100 percent sales to Beijing Hyundai (Daewoo and JCI sales to Kia). Sales to Beijing Hyundai with 
JCI according to the car models. No plans to export to Korea. 
 Having difficulty in the price cut-down 
 Planning to expand the sales channels  
F  Depending on Beijing Hyundai for about 95 percent of its sales. Assembling module sales to Daimler Chrysler, Air bag sales to Nanjing Automobile 
G 
 Direct sales to Hyundai (30%), Hyundai Mobis, GM, Mando, Dongfeng Yueda Kia, Beijing Benz 
(BBDC). The headquarter contracting with these firms. Less than 10 percent of buy-back. 
 Doing business with Hyundai is more secure than developing other sales channels such as Chinese 
local firms who can abruptly break the business relations. Ultimately planning to develop new sales 
routes to Chinese firms and global firms like GM, etc. 
 Difficulties in sales are cost reduction. But the competitiveness enhanced as complying with cost 
reduction. 
 No sales to Japanese firms 
Source: Interviews 
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3.4 R&D and Production Strategies 
The R&D and production structure of the seven interviewed component suppliers 
was characterized as follows: 
 Except for D company, the component suppliers are not equipped with R&D 
institutes. In other words, most of the firms have their R&D functions in Korea, and 
doing mass production of the components in China. It is said that the R&D function 
in China will be needed if the Korean carmakers production of cars in China reaches 
1 million cars.  
 The component suppliers have the capacity-lagging strategies that they follow with 
the carmakers’ increase in production capacity in order to avert the risk. Thus the 
component suppliers expanded their production capacity as Beijing Hyundai grew. 
And most of them secured enough factory sites. 
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Table 18: Characteristics of the R&D and Production Structure of the Interviewed 
Component Suppliers in China 
R&D and Production Strategies 
A 
 Production goal of 500 thousand cars in 2008, separately producing with the parent firm in Korea 
(No division of labor in the process)  
 Primarily carrying out R&D with the carmaker together, and having 23 employees in the 
development department. 
 Test taken in Korea and production done in Beijing 
 With the production goal of quality equal to Toyota, price level equal to Chinese local firms, 
developing the models that are tailored for the demand of the Chinese domestic market 
B 
 100,000 in 2003; planning to produce 500,000 in 2007 
 B company owns 80 percent shares and Chinese Xinggufazhangongsi owns 20 percent. Set up a 
joint venture considering the possibility of listing. 
 The quality problems in the early stage overcome by the training and technology enhancement 
with the support from Korean headquarter. 
 R&D center in Korea. New product development in H/Q and mass production in Beijing. Local 
R&D center will be needed if 1 million cars are to be produced. 
C 
 Division of labor with Korea H/Q in the production process (importing semi-finished products 
 No self R&D function, and production only in Beijing. 
 Cost reduction compensation method: Transferring the CR when purchasing, promoting 
localization, and suggesting CR plans to the carmakers 
 Have intentions of dealing with Chinese local firms or foreign firms but retaining the plan in the 
case of Chinese local firms due to many risks 
D 
 Having R&D institutes (7 expatriates, 80 engineers, 2 test fields) 
 Production design in Korea H/Q, application to Chinese market in Beijing 
 Easily recruited good employees in Beijing. 
 No division of labor of with Korea H/Q, full production system in China. 
 At the moment, market shares in Chinese auto taken up 7 percent by Korea, 30 percent by 
Chinese local firms, 27 percent by Japan, 23 percent by EU and 13 percent by the United States. 
Chinese local firms are expected to take more than 50 percent with the support of the Chinese 
government. This will bring about the shrinking in market shares of Korea and the US, etc. 
 Secured factory site for 1 million production capacity, and established 600,000 production 
capacity around Beijing. 
E  located within 5 km from Beijing Hyundai  Annually producing 250,000 as of now;  capability of producing 400,000 cars maximum  
F  Annual production capability of 300,000 cars (module factory 300,000/year; I/P factory 600,000/year) 
G  Annual production capability of 1.4 million cars 
Source: Interviews. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The outlook for the Chinese automobile market is that cut-throat competition 
among around 110 joint ventures and local automotive companies left the carmakers 
with a huge oversupply brought about by the aggressive expansion of production 
facilities. Thus the average purchase price of passenger cars is projected to continue to 
drop until 2010 (see Figure 5).  In this scenario, the high quality and cost 
competitiveness of the vehicles and automotive components will be the decisive factors 
for business success. And these success factors will be largely dependent on the extent 
of localization of the automotive firms.  
 
Figure 5: The Outlook for Price Cut-down in Chinese Automotive 
Market 
 
           Source: Interview with Hyundai Motors. 
 
On the other hand, the carmakers entering into China plan to expand their 
production capacity according to an increment of the Chinese market demand and this 
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will change the structure of component sourcing in the end. In other words, enlarged 
production capacity will demand more component suppliers so that the carmakers can 
expand or change their sourcing firms. At this time, the imperative points for selecting 
sourcing firms will be the localization of the component sourcing for price 
competitiveness. However, Chinese local firms cannot meet the quality specifications as 
of now. Therefore it is necessary to select and raise the local firms.  
Also, the Korean component suppliers that accompanied the carmakers into China 
need to localize their sourcing firms and diversify the sales channels as the conditions of 
the carmakers are changing. Especially concerning the diversification of the sales 
channels, they should develop new sales routes to the Chinese local firms with rapid 
growth, to foreign enterprises with global network, and expand the exports overseas.  
The Korean government should also intervene for the joint advance of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) into China, provide the necessary field information, and 
support the business matchmaking fairs to select and nurture the superior local firms.  
In terms of the cooperation between Korea-Japan firms in China, it is not likely for 
Korean component suppliers to sell their products to Japan carmakers because of the 
great distance from Beijing to Guangzhou where Japanese companies are establishing 
clusters and there are many Japanese components suppliers accompanying the Japanese 
carmakers. And yet certain types of cooperative models should be found to avoid 
excessive competition between the two countries in Chinese market in the future. In 
addition, regional economic integration like Korea-China-Japan free trade agreement 
should be achieved to reduce the trade cost within the region. 
Lastly, in terms of the changes in the production network of the automobile 
industry, the trend will be very similar both at home (Korea) and in China in the future. 
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This means that the production network with strong exclusiveness will be changed into 
more open or western style production network. The reason is that in the early stage of 
investment of Korean automotive industry into China, the domestic production network 
was transplanted into China the way it was, but it seems that with the rapid changes in 
the business environment, the production network in China is also experiencing the 
reduction in exclusive dealings and the expansion of component sourcing partners just 
as the domestic production network. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
i This paper is the modified and completed version of Chapter 5 in Jung and Lee (2007). 
ii Korean term for a conglomerate of many companies clustered around one parent company. 
iii See Cho, S.J. et al. (2004), pp. 137-138. 
iv On the other hand, Bok, D.K. (2002) found that foreign investment into Korean component firms 
was not significantly related to the change of component supply structure, i.e., increase of the 
number of firms the component suppliers transacted with, since the foreign firms invested into 
component suppliers that were already transacting with multiple assembling companies.  
v Cho, S.J. et al. (2004), pp. 152-154. 
vi Daewoo Motors established joint ventures in Guilin (桂林) in 1994 and in Yantai (煙台) in 1996. 
But owing to the bankruptcy of the group, the automotive business of the Daewoo group was 
acquired by General Motors and other companies. 
vii Mostly referenced from Lim, K.T. (2003), pp. 214-219. 
viii There are two Korean carmakers in China, Beijing Hyundai and 東風悅達起亞, but due to 
information access limitations, this paper only deals with Beijing Hyundai. 
ix HPV (Hours Per Vehicle) is the value of total hours spent on the production, production 
management, maintenance, quality control and support, etc. divided by the total number of 
produced cars; the lower the value is, the higher the productivity. 
x The field research in Beijing found that the prices of 49 models in China were lowered 7.9 percent 
on the average. 
xi Oh J.S. (2007) 
366 
 
xii Korean export of automotive components to China has a very high annual growth of 102.6 
percent on the average after 2001, and has shown a 34-fold increase from 2001 to 2006. The 
imports recorded an increase of 22.7 times over the same period. This owes very much to Hyundai 
Motors’ and its related component suppliers entry into the rapidly growing Chinese car market. 
xiii The criteria for the SME of domestic auto component suppliers are 50-299 employees or less 
than 8 billion KW of capital stock; for firms entering China, only the number of employees is 
considered. Therefore, the comparison to the domestic firms just takes the employment scale into 
account. 
xiv Beijing Hyundai Motors interview 
xv On the interview result of one carmaker (BHMC), refer to the chapter 2 ‘Korean Automotive 
Companies’ Production Network in China’.  
xvi Another survey result showed that 22 auto component suppliers’ localization of material sourcing 
was 51% on the average and the proportion of Korean component suppliers reached 61%. The 
localization percentage reflected in this interview is higher than that of the survey because the 
interviewed firms mainly doing business with Beijing Hyundai had to increase local sourcing 
proportion to keep up with the demand of the rapidly growing Beijing Hyundai. Please see Yang 
P.S. et al. (2007). 
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